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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






RAMOND ROBERT MARTIN, 
a/k/a Ralph H. Martin, a/k/a John Royal, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
                                       Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A072-784-087) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Daniel A. Morris 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2018 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







 Ramond Robert Martin, a native and citizen of Jamaica, arrived in the United 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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States in 1990 as a visitor and adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident in 
2004.  In 2012, he was convicted of several violations of N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-5(a)(1) 
(making it unlawful to “manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under 
his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous 
substance or controlled substance analog”) and N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-5(b)(3) (describing his 
cocaine crime as a third degree offense and setting the fine).   
 On May 7, 2015, after the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court 
had affirmed his judgment of conviction but before the New Jersey Supreme Court had 
ruled on his timely petition for certification of that decision, the Government charged 
Martin as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony relating to drug 
trafficking and for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense.  R. 672-74.  
Martin, through counsel, sought to terminate the removal proceedings on the basis that 
his conviction was not final in light of the ongoing direct appeal proceedings.  R. 639-40.  
Initially, the Government requested time to investigate the matter, but then, after the New 
Jersey Supreme Court ruled, the Government opposed the motion to terminate on the 
basis that the petition for certification had been denied on July 10, 2015.  R. 525.   
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained the charges after Martin appeared with 
different counsel, Lauren Anselowitz, who reviewed the notice to appear and judgment of 
conviction at the hearing and then, on behalf of Martin, conceded the allegations related 
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to the conviction and removability charges.1  R. 117.  At a later hearing, she re-raised a 
version of the initial argument for termination.  She stated that the conviction was not 
final at the time that the notice to appear issued, but first stated incorrectly that Martin’s 
appeal had been pending before the Appellate Division, and later represented that the 
appeal became final at the end of March 2015, when the Appellate Division ruled.   The 
IJ explained that Martin was served with the notice to appear on May 7, 2015, so “that 
takes care of that.”  R. 139.   At the next hearing, Anselowitz again sought termination, 
this time on the actual initial argument that the petition for certification remained pending 
when Martin was served with the notice to appear.  The Government opposed the motion, 
arguing that the conviction was final and the discretionary appeal did not affect its 
finality because it was not granted.  The IJ denied the motion on the basis that there was a 
final conviction.  R. 148.      
 After continuances, Martin appeared before a different IJ with new counsel, who, 
inter alia, sought a continuance and renewed and argued the motion to terminate based on 
a pro se motion that Martin had filed.  R. 204-15.  The IJ concluded that good cause did 
not exist for an additional continuance.  The IJ treated the motion to terminate as a 
motion to withdraw the concession regarding Martin’s conviction and noted that, 
although there may have been a pending appeal, which a previous IJ did not realize, it 
was a moot issue because the conviction had become final.  R. 209.  In his written 
                                              
1 She also notified the IJ that Martin had filed a PCR petition in New Jersey and 
confirmed that the “petition for certiorari” was denied.  R. at 118.   
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decision, the IJ concluded that Martin had not shown that he should be allowed to 
withdraw his admissions to the allegations and charge and found that Martin had been 
convicted of the crimes described in the notice to appeal.  Citing the Matter of Montiel, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 555 (BIA 2015),2 the IJ affirmed the previous IJ’s rulings relating to the 
motion to terminate and denied the renewed motion to terminate.  The IJ ordered that 
Martin be removed.   
 Martin took an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA 
ruled that, although Martin argued that his notice to appear should be reissued because 
his conviction was on direct appeal when the notice to appear issued, he was bound by 
his concession.  The BIA concluded that Martin did not overcome the presumption that 
the concession was a reasonable tactical decision binding on him under Matter of 
Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986).  The BIA further ruled that Martin 
could not overcome the fact that all direct appeals of his criminal conviction were final 
and that his conviction was final for immigration purposes.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
decision denying the motion for a continuance and the motion to terminate the 
proceedings. 
 Martin, pro se, presents a petition for review.  He raises two main arguments.  
                                              
2 In Matter of Montiel, the BIA delayed the proceedings while a direct appeal was 
pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, only to reinstate and resolve the case 
(without the issuance of a new notice to appear) when the appeals process had ended. 
See, e.g., Matter of Montiel, A087 060 138 - SAN, 2016 WL 3226614, at *1 (BIA May 




First, as he has done since the outset of his case, he relies on Orabi v. Attorney General of 
the United States, 738 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2014), to claim that the proceedings should have 
been terminated because he was not removable as charged because his conviction was not 
final when the notice to appear issued.  In relation to this, he further states that his 
conviction is not yet final because he has an appeal still pending.  Second, Martin argues 
that he is entitled to relief because Anselowitz’s “concession” on his behalf was a product 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 Because Martin was found removable as an aggravated felon, our jurisdiction is 
limited; however, we retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law.3  
See Pierre v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D)); cf. also Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 473 F.3d 
58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 
2005), for the proposition that the “jurisdictional grant regarding appeals by aggravated 
felons extends not just to legal determinations but also to application of law to facts”).   
 As Martin states, in this circuit, a conviction is not considered final for 
immigration purposes until direct appellate review has been exhausted or waived.  Orabi, 
738 F.3d at 543.  But see Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (changing 
its rule post-IIRIRA to join the opinions of four other circuit courts and concluding that a 
                                              
3 Although the Government argues that Martin raises no legal issue, we disagree.  Among 
other things, he specifically argues that the BIA violated the law of our circuit in 




conviction under the INA requires only that a trial court enter a formal judgment of guilt 
and does not require the exhaustion or waiver of all direct appeals).4  Accordingly, as 
Martin has pressed since the beginning of his immigration proceedings, his judgment of 
conviction was not final for immigration purposes when the notice to appear issued 
because his direct appeal was not yet complete (he had a pending petition for 
discretionary relief in the New Jersey Supreme Court).  See Orabi, 738 F.3d at 543.  At 
the time the notice to appear issued, the Government had no basis on which remove 
Martin.    
                                              
4 We note that the BIA, in Matter of Montiel, ruled within the geographical limits of the 




 However, the IJ did not immediately rule on the motion to terminate, and, as the 
BIA noted, Martin’s direct appeal later concluded.  Upon review, we conclude that that 
subsequent event rendered permissible the denial of the motion to terminate (and the 
renewed motions to terminate).  The statute provides that it is “[a]t the conclusion of the 
proceeding [that] the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from 
the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).  In this case, there is no dispute that 
Martin’s convictions were final once all his direct appeals were rejected, prior to the 
conclusion of the immigration proceeding.  Then, Martin was removable based on the 
convictions listed on the notice to appear.5  For this reason, we will deny the petition for 
review.6  
                                              
5 The BIA concluded that Martin’s evidence did not show that any direct appeal was still 
pending.  To the extent that conclusion is factual, we cannot review it.  To the extent that 
the conclusion was a legal ruling on the finality of his proceedings, we do not disagree 
with it.  For instance, the BIA was correct in concluding that any pending collateral 
attack on the conviction did not affect its finality for immigration purposes.  See Paredes 
v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008).   
    
6 Because the BIA ruled that Martin’s removal was appropriate because all direct appeals 
had been completed or because Martin conceded removability through Anselowitz and 
had not shown that the concession was the result of unreasonable professional judgment 
or was so unfair as to have produced an unjust result, see Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986), we need not reach the aspect of the BIA’s ruling based on a 
concession.  However, we note that, even if Martin raises a strong challenge to the BIA’s 
legal conclusion that Anselowitz acted strategically when she gave away his only viable 
argument (that he was not convicted for immigration purposes because his conviction 
was not final when the notice to appear issued), in the end, the argument would not win 
the case.  That his conviction was final before the denial of his motions to terminate and 
at the conclusion of his immigration proceedings controlled the outcome in the agency.   
 
